U.S.–Israel policy toward Iran has produced a strategic trap. Efforts to eliminate a perceived threat have instead increased regional insecurity, strengthened Iran’s deterrence capabilities, and reduced the United States’ ability to project power globally.
For decades, Washington, closely aligned with Israel, has identified Iran as a central threat to Middle Eastern stability. This perception has justified a wide range of policies, including economic sanctions, covert operations, proxy conflicts, and direct military pressure. However, this policy continuity masks a fundamental flaw. Rather than stabilising the region or neutralising the threat, U.S.–Israel policy has created a self-reinforcing cycle of escalation. Actions framed as strategic assertiveness have, in effect, resulted in strategic entrapment.
A persistent pattern of threat inflation underlies this policy approach. Iran is routinely portrayed as an expansionist power seeking regional dominance, which is used to justify containment at any cost. This narrative has shaped elite discourse in Washington and Tel Aviv, limiting the range of acceptable policy options. As John Mearsheimer argues, “the idea that Iran is a serious threat, much less an existential threat, is not a serious argument.” This view is consistent with offensive realism, which holds that powerful states frequently exaggerate threats to legitimize assertive strategies designed to maintain dominance in the international system.
This inflated threat perception has shifted policy from containment to coercion. Instead of managing Iran within a regional balance of power, the United States and Israel have pursued strategies intended to decisively weaken or potentially collapse the Iranian state. The rationale is that if Iran’s regime is internally fragile, overwhelming external pressure might prompt rapid political change. A decisive strike, often described as a “shock and awe” campaign, is expected to remove leadership, destabilise the state, and force either surrender or internal collapse.
However, this logic reflects a flawed understanding of state behavior under external pressure. Realist theory indicates that when survival is at stake, states are more likely to resist than to capitulate. Historical examples, such as Vietnam, show that U.S. expectations of military superiority producing rapid political change have often led to prolonged resistance. External pressure rarely causes collapse; instead, it tends to foster internal cohesion, mobilize nationalist sentiment, and reinforce state resolve.
Iran exemplifies this pattern. Its behavior is not anomalous but structurally determined. Any state subjected to sustained pressure from more powerful adversaries will prioritize survival by investing in deterrence, developing asymmetric capabilities, and avoiding direct confrontation while raising the costs of aggression. Therefore, Iran’s strategy is fundamentally strategic rather than ideological.
In international relations, this dynamic is explained by integrating the security dilemma with deterrence and coercion theory. In a typical security dilemma, both states act defensively but perceive each other as threats, leading to mutual suspicion. Power asymmetry alters this interaction. When weaker states adopt defensive measures, they may still be perceived as aggressive, increasing uncertainty. Conversely, when a much stronger state employs coercive tools such as sanctions, military threats, attacks, or regime pressure, these actions signal a credible threat to the weaker state’s survival. The situation then shifts from misperception to deterrence under existential risk, prompting weaker states to adopt more risk-tolerant strategies, such as escalation or brinkmanship, because inaction may result in regime or state collapse.
Much of what Washington and Tel Aviv interpret as Iranian aggression is a predictable result of this dynamic. Efforts to eliminate Iran as a strategic problem have instead ensured its persistence, illustrating deterrence failure. By applying overwhelming pressure, U.S.–Israel policy has increased Iran’s incentives to resist and reduced opportunities for de-escalation.
Iran’s response has not involved symmetrical power competition but instead focuses on exploiting structural vulnerabilities. Lacking the ability to match the United States or Israel in conventional military terms, Iran employs asymmetric leverage to raise the costs of conflict beyond acceptable limits. Chief among these strategies is its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for global oil supplies.
This capability grants Iran a significant strategic advantage. The potential to disrupt global energy markets can transform a regional conflict into a global crisis. The Strait of Hormuz thus serves as a strategic equalizer, allowing a weaker state to deter stronger powers by threatening consequences that reach far beyond the immediate conflict zone.
The implications of this dynamic are systemic. Any prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would immediately affect energy prices, global trade, and financial stability. In an interconnected global economy, such shocks can quickly cascade, generating consequences that extend well beyond the original conflict area. Policies that heighten the risk of such disruption are destabilizing on a global scale.
Beyond regional considerations, this policy carries significant implications for U.S. grand strategy. Realist theory distinguishes between possessing power and using it effectively. Although the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system by conventional measures, its ability to project power depends on alliances, institutional legitimacy, and strategic credibility.
Current policy is undermining these foundational elements. Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf are increasingly questioning U.S. strategic judgment, perceiving a pattern of unilateral and escalatory behavior that appears inconsistent with long-term planning. Although this may not cause an immediate rupture, it encourages gradual distancing as states hedge, diversify strategic relationships, seek greater autonomy, and reduce reliance on American leadership.
Over time, this process weakens the alliance networks that have historically amplified U.S. power. The United States may retain its capabilities but loses the ability to translate them into influence. Great powers generally decline not through sudden defeat, but through the gradual erosion of their capacity to shape international outcomes.
At the systemic level, these consequences are even more significant. The international system is becoming increasingly multipolar, with China emerging as the primary long-term competitor to the United States. Although American grand strategy has consistently emphasized prioritizing East Asia, confrontation with Iran diverts attention, military resources, and political capital from this strategic priority. This situation creates a fundamental contradiction: a strategy designed to preserve American dominance ends up undermining its position in the most critical arena of competition. As Mearsheimer notes, such circumstances are “Manna from heaven” for China. While the United States becomes entangled in a costly regional conflict, China gains strategic space to expand its influence and consolidate its position.
This exemplifies the logic of strategic overextension. Great powers rarely collapse from direct defeat; instead, they decline by adopting policies that drain resources, divert attention, and entangle them in conflicts that do not align with their core interests. U.S.–Israel policy toward Iran demonstrates this pattern.
The central irony is clear: a policy intended to eliminate a threat has instead ensured its persistence. A strategy designed to demonstrate strength has exposed its limitations. A regional actor that might have been managed within a balance of power has become a principal source of instability.
Ultimately, the question is not whether the United States and Israel can impose costs on Iran, as this is evident. The critical issue is whether these actions create a stable, favourable strategic environment. By intensifying security competition, undermining alliances, and diverting strategic focus, current policy has created a self-reinforcing cycle of escalation.
Great powers must adopt a structural perspective, recognizing that other states respond to pressure in predictable ways. Failure to do so risks entrapment in self-generated conflicts. U.S.–Israel policy toward Iran exemplifies this trap: a powerful coalition overestimating its ability to reshape the political landscape while underestimating the resistance it provokes.
The outcome is not enhanced security but a self-inflicted strategic risis that will persist as long as the underlying assumptions remain unchanged.
