
In an era increasingly defined by geopolitical uncertainty and strategic rivalry, few voices have remained as steady and provocative as that of Professor John J. Mearsheimer, one of the most influential political scientists of our time. In an exclusive Horizons interview, moderated by Vuk Jeremić, President of CIRSD, Mearsheimer delivers a rigorous and unsettling diagnosis: the era of unchallenged U.S. dominance is over, and the world has entered a new age of great-power politics.
From the early 1990s until around 2017, the international system was marked by what Mearsheimer calls a unipolar moment, a unique period in history where the United States stood alone as the only true great power. This absence of strategic rivals meant that there was little meaningful security competition. During this time, U.S. foreign policy was driven by a sense of mission: to spread liberal democracy and reshape the world in its own image. Mearsheimer refers to this strategy as liberal hegemony, an ambitious, idealistic, and ultimately flawed approach.
But that moment of unipolarity, he argues, was always destined to be temporary. The rise of China and the reemergence of Russia as serious players on the world stage have brought about a structural shift. By 2017, the world had decisively transitioned to a multipolar system, in which three great powers, China, Russia, and the United States, compete for influence, power, and security. This transformation marks the return of structural forces long obscured by liberal optimism: fear, competition, and the tragic logic of international politics.
What distinguishes Mearsheimer’s analysis is his insistence on structure over sentiment. He challenges the prevailing assumption that economic interdependence would ensure peace. Many policymakers believed that trade and globalization would bind countries together so tightly that conflict would become irrational. But as Mearsheimer notes, history offers a different lesson. Before World War I, Europe was deeply economically intertwined, yet war still came. Today, the same illusion lingers in U.S.-China relations, despite mounting tensions. Indeed, economic dependence has created new vulnerabilities. China’s dominance in rare earth materials has given it leverage over Washington, which found itself backing off aggressive trade measures once confronted with this dependency.
Perhaps the most consequential strategic error, in Mearsheimer’s view, has been the West’s handling of Russia. He argues that pushing Russia into China’s orbit, especially through NATO expansion and the Ukraine crisis, has created a powerful anti-American bloc. This growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing, he warns, is a “strategic blunder of the highest order.” From a realist standpoint, the United States should have done the opposite: seek rapprochement with Russia to offset China’s rise, similar to Nixon and Kissinger’s 1972 outreach to China to divide the communist world. Instead, U.S. policy has made these two rivals more aligned than ever.
As U.S. strategic focus shifts toward Asia, the consequences are reverberating in Europe. For decades, Europe’s cohesion and security were upheld by the American umbrella, through NATO and the broader liberal order. Now, as U.S. commitments strain and strategic attention pivots, Europe’s internal divisions are coming to the surface. Mearsheimer cautions against viewing Europe as a unified actor. He anticipates growing fractures among European states, especially over relations with Russia. Some countries will seek accommodation; others will resist. Without the unifying force of American leadership, these tensions are likely to deepen. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has poisoned relations between Russia and Europe for the foreseeable future, ensuring lasting instability.
The dynamics of middle powers, nations like India, Brazil, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, further complicate this multipolar landscape. These states are attempting to hedge: maintaining strong economic ties with China while relying on U.S. security guarantees. This balancing act offers temporary flexibility but, Mearsheimer warns, cannot last indefinitely. When survival is at stake, countries will be forced to choose sides. India, once moving steadily toward closer alignment with the U.S., is now hedging more assertively, partly in response to American pressure over its relations with Russia. Conversely, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, despite occasional maneuvering, remain strategically closer to Washington, though even that is not guaranteed in the long run.
Global institutions, once seen as guardians of a rules-based international order, are now struggling under the weight of multipolar rivalry. The UN, WTO, and other multilateral bodies, once tools of U.S. influence, are increasingly paralyzed. Mearsheimer explains that these institutions reflect the balance of power, not some higher international morality. In the unipolar era, they worked because the U.S. was dominant. In a multipolar world, they have become contested arenas. As a result, what we are seeing is not the strengthening of international order, but the rise of regionally bound orders: competing blocs built by the great powers themselves. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization form a Chinese-led sphere that excludes the U.S., while the West consolidates its own structures in response.
This fractured landscape also increases the risk of accidental war. Mearsheimer identifies several global flashpoints. In East Asia, three zones are especially dangerous: Taiwan, where China is determined to reclaim what it sees as sacred territory; the South China Sea, where Beijing rejects U.S. claims to international waters; and the East China Sea, where disputes over islands raise the risk of miscalculation between China and Japan. In Europe, even if the Ukraine war freezes into a stalemate, Mearsheimer warns that it will remain volatile, and that other flashpoints exist, including Kaliningrad, the Arctic, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. Any of these could spark a wider conflict.
When asked whether the deep polarization within the United States could undermine its strategic coherence, Mearsheimer is cautiously optimistic. He acknowledges the toxicity of domestic politics, but insists that foreign policy consensus, especially regarding China, remains largely intact. Both major political parties recognize the need to contain China, even if they differ on tactics. This structural pressure, he argues, will ensure that U.S. foreign policy remains largely rational. That said, he critiques the current policy on Ukraine, particularly under the Biden administration, as strategically misguided. Continuing Cold War-era goals in a multipolar world, he argues, is not only outdated but dangerous. He views Donald Trump’s approach, for all its controversy, as a rational attempt to recalibrate U.S. strategy, especially in seeking to improve ties with Russia to isolate China.
Mearsheimer’s analysis is sobering. The liberal assumptions that shaped the post-Cold War world, belief in peaceful globalization, institutional cooperation, and the pacifying effects of trade, have not survived the return of multipolar rivalry. As structural realism reminds us, power matters. Strategic geography matters. The fear and uncertainty that shape state behavior have not disappeared; they have returned to center stage.
For those seeking to understand the trajectory of world politics today, Mearsheimer offers not comfort, but clarity. He reminds us that international relations are shaped less by goodwill than by cold calculations of power. And as the global order fractures, recognizing these structural realities is more important than ever.




