Amid the missile strikes and oil-price volatility, a less publicised development has emerged in the 2026 Iran war, one that does not directly involve Washington, Tehran, or Tel Aviv. Instead, it centres on Islamabad. Pakistan has functioned as one of the few effective diplomatic channels between the United States and Iran in recent months. This development should not be considered a mere footnote; rather, it offers a preview of how middle powers may operate in a context where the traditional norms of American primacy no longer apply automatically.
Why did the door open
The underlying logic is straightforward: when a dominant power’s ambitions exceed its actual capabilities, as has been evident in the Gulf, where American military assets have not produced a decisive outcome against Iran, another actor fills the resulting void. However, not every state is positioned to assume this role. It requires a country with credible relationships on both sides of the conflict and no compelling interest in a decisive victory for either party. Pakistan exemplifies this profile, maintaining strong ties with Saudi Arabia, a longstanding relationship with Iran, and an active diplomatic channel to Washington.
An alternative explanation also merits consideration. A more pragmatic interpretation suggests that Pakistan’s mediation is driven less by strategic vision and more by economic interests: millions of Pakistanis are employed in the Gulf, remittances are vital to the national economy, and regional stability is economically advantageous. This perspective is likely valid as well. These explanations are not mutually exclusive; rather, they reinforce one another.
What the mediation has actually produced
It is common to commend a country for “punching above its weight” without verifying the accuracy of such claims. To assess this, consider Article 5 of the June memorandum, which governs control of the Strait of Hormuz during the sixty-day negotiation period and beyond. This clause was shaped through the involvement of Pakistan and Oman. It granted Iran interim control of the strait, leaving the long-term arrangement to be negotiated directly between Iran and Oman. The United States is not mentioned in this provision. This omission became significant when Washington attempted to establish its own shipping channel, which Iran regarded as a violation. The fact that Pakistan and Oman, rather than any Western power, were central to drafting this arrangement indicates a shift in diplomatic influence within the Gulf region.
Following the breakdown of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities in July, reports indicate that Pakistan and Oman remain the most active in efforts to restart negotiations. This suggests that both countries may be more invested in ending the conflict than either Washington or Tehran, as the primary belligerents continue to seek leverage through ongoing hostilities.
The part nobody likes to mention
Mediation entails high costs, and it is important not to idealise the process. Prior to the conflict, approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil transited the Persian Gulf. Much of this flow has been disrupted by the Hormuz standoff and the Houthis’ blockade of Saudi shipping through the Red Sea. Pakistan’s economy is directly affected, as reflected in rising import costs and already-strained foreign reserves. Serving as a credible mediator with substantial interests at stake enhances trustworthiness to both parties, but also increases vulnerability. A prolonged conflict imposes costs not only on Iran and the Gulf states but also on Pakistan.
A more challenging reality, often overlooked in optimistic analyses, is that Pakistan’s influence is derived entirely from its relationships rather than from material power. While Pakistan can facilitate dialogue, it lacks the capacity to compel outcomes. Should Iran continue to gain leverage as the conflict endures, as several analysts, including Mearsheimer, suggest, Pakistan’s role may shift from brokering an equitable agreement to managing the terms of a settlement favourable to Iran. This represents a fundamentally different diplomatic function, and it is essential for Islamabad to recognise the nature of its evolving role.
Where I think this goes
China introduces an additional dimension to this analysis. Beijing has a vested interest in Gulf stability, due to its energy imports and its reported interest in Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. A Pakistan capable of engaging credibly with Washington, Riyadh, Tehran, and Beijing simultaneously occupies a distinct diplomatic position compared to one limited to bilateral engagement. While more concrete evidence is needed before asserting that China is directly influencing the Pakistan-Oman channel, its involvement aligns with the broader regional context.
The central issue is not the value of this form of mediation, as the June memorandum has already demonstrated its significance. Rather, the key question is whether Pakistan can transform this episode of crisis diplomacy into a lasting institutional role, rather than relying on a fortuitous convergence of relationships. At present, Pakistan has a unique opportunity. Whether it can establish a durable framework from this position remains uncertain.
