When asked why strikes on Iran continue, American officials consistently respond that pressure is effective, Iran is at its weakest, and one final effort will force Tehran to comply. However, when pressed for specifics on what this decisive action entails, their answers become unclear. After five months of conflict, the gap between official confidence and strategic clarity remains significant.
The story officials are telling, and the one the battlefield is telling.
Washington has maintained a consistent narrative since the summer, claiming Iran’s industrial base is destroyed, its defenses are weakened, and surrender is imminent. However, this narrative is not supported by current developments.
The initial strikes on February 28 led to approximately forty days of intense air operations, which ceased not due to Iranian capitulation, but because American munitions were depleted, as officials have acknowledged. The subsequent ceasefire resulted in a memorandum of understanding in mid-June, granting Iran effective control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during negotiations. When Washington attempted to redirect tankers through a separate, American-monitored channel, Iran deemed it a violation and targeted ships using that route. This pattern of reciprocal actions has continued since early July.
If Iran were as depleted as officials such as Pete Hegseth suggest, this would be reflected in operational data, but it is not. Analysts, including John Mearsheimer, report no evidence that Iran’s missile and drone stockpiles are diminishing. American bases in the Gulf and Jordan continue to be targeted, prompting U.S. assets to withdraw first from the Gulf to Jordan, and now from Jordan toward Israel, with each relocation exposing new vulnerabilities. Before the conflict, approximately 130 ships transited the Strait of Hormuz daily; recently, this number has dropped to 10 or 12, all using the route controlled by Iran rather than the one preferred by Washington. This does not reflect the position of a side losing control of a strategic chokepoint.
Why bombing alone rarely works.
Strategic theory distinguishes between the power to inflict harm and the power to compel. These concepts are not synonymous. Inflicting harm only leads to capitulation if the adversary determines that continued resistance is more costly than surrender, a calculation that fails when a government perceives an existential threat. Iran’s leadership appears to hold this view, especially following the assassination of its supreme leader at the outset of the conflict. Historical precedents, such as bombing campaigns in the Second World War, Korea, and Vietnam, did not achieve surrender through airpower alone. There is no clear reason to expect a different outcome in this case.
That’s really the whole problem in a sentence. The core issue is that officials frequently reference “escalation dominance” without articulating a clear causal link between increased strikes and Iranian surrender. If such a strategy were effective, it would likely already have been implemented. A more immediate concern is the finite nature of U.S. munitions. Washington is managing challenges from a rising China in the Pacific, ongoing support for Ukraine, and now a major conflict in the Gulf. Every precision munition used against Iran reduces reserves available for other strategic theaters, such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. This is evident in the frequent relocation of American forces, which reflects a lack of secure positions rather than a deliberate strategic maneuver.
These developments do not occur in isolation. Over the past decade, the global order has shifted from unipolarity as China has grown stronger and Russia has reasserted itself as a major power. Both countries have a clear interest in seeing the United States engaged in a costly Middle Eastern conflict, which diverts attention from efforts to contain them. Whether or not Beijing and Moscow are directly supplying Iran, their incentive to allow the conflict to continue is evident.
Where this is headed
If this assessment is accurate, several developments are likely: further withdrawal of American assets toward Israel as bases in the Gulf and Jordan become untenable, increased pressure for a second memorandum of understanding on less favorable terms than the June agreement, and a gradual erosion of Gulf states’ confidence in American security guarantees, regardless of how the conflict is ultimately portrayed.
This does not suggest that escalation is inherently misguided. However, escalation without a clear and credible path to a defined outcome does not constitute a strategy; it is merely a reaction. Current evidence indicates that this has been the prevailing approach of the United States in recent months.
